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A Coherent Inconsistency: Italian Cultural 
Diplomacy in Palestine, 1918–1938
Roberto Mazza
A recent report of the Italian NGO COSV (Coordinamento delle 
Organizzazioni per il Servizio Volontario) suggests that “it was not until the 
1995 Euro-Mediterranean Conference that Italy began to take on a prom-
inent role in the Mediterranean region”.1 It is possible Italy lagged behind 
other countries in the development of cultural diplomacy, nevertheless Italian 
cultural influence in the Mediterranean, and in Palestine in particular, cer-
tainly predates 1995. Studies of European cultural policies in Palestine have 
often focused on Britain, France and occasionally Germany, however very lit-
tle scholarship has been dedicated to Italy. The works of Nir Arielli, Daniela 
Fabrizio, Lucia Rostagno and Arturo Marzano shed light on some aspects 
of early Italian cultural diplomacy and relations in Mandatory Palestine.2 Yet 
the literature available, but more importantly the research currently carried 
out on this topic, is rather scant and often unclear on how cultural diplomacy 
should be defined. The lack of sources has certainly been one reason behind 
© The Author(s) 2021 
K. Sanchez Summerer and S. Zananiri (eds.), European Cultural 
Diplomacy and Arab Christians in Palestine, 1918–1948, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55540-5_16
R. Mazza (*) 
University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland
e-mail: Roberto.Mazza@ul.ie
1 Organisation for the coordination of volunteering services; last modified May 9, 2018, 
http://www.cosv.org/.
2 Nir Arielli, Fascist Italy and the Middle East 1933–40 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); 
Daniela Fabrizio, Identita’ Nazionali e Identita’ Religiose (Rome: Studium, 2004); Arturo 
Marzano, Onde Fasciste. La Propaganda Araba di Radio Bari 1934–43 (Rome: Carocci, 2015); 
Lucia Rostagno, Terrasanta o Palestina? La Diplomazia Italiana e il Nazionalismo Palestinese 
(1861–1939) (Rome: Bardi, 1996).
332  R. MAZZA
this shortage of studies, however the problematic definition of cultural diplo-
macy has also kept scholars away from potential complications. Nevertheless, 
as the material of the Italian consulate in Jerusalem from its opening in 
the 1860s to the 1940s has been made accessible, it will be possible to add 
important contributions and preliminarily assess Italian cultural diplomacy in 
Palestine, its effectiveness and legacy—if any—over the local population: Arab 
and Jews in their multiplicity of identities and organisations.
What role did culture play in the policies of European agents—govern-
mental and non—regarding the Arabs and Jews of Palestine? With this chap-
ter I will try to answer this question looking at the work of Italian diplomacy 
in Palestine from 1918 to the mid-1930s, essentially from the establishment 
of British rule to the outbreak of the Arab Revolt which marked a major shift 
in the local and international political atmosphere. Looking at the material of 
the Italian consulate in Jerusalem and its subsidiaries throughout Palestine, 
this chapter will attempt to reconstruct Italian cultural activities particularly 
designed to promote linguistic and cultural agendas. Italians followed similar 
paths to their French rivals in the establishment of educational institutions.3 
More importantly, from the establishment of the Fascist regime in 1922, 
Mussolini attempted to support Arab nationalism and Zionism at the same 
time with the purpose of challenging British rule in Palestine and creating a 
stronger Italian presence and influence in the region. Italian cultural diplo-
macy was then used as a proxy in order to create support for Italian expan-
sion, rather than producing genuine cultural relations.
In this chapter I look at consular records in order to highlight several case 
studies with the purpose of seeing how Italian cultural diplomacy developed 
in the region, its transformations, inconsistencies and ultimate failure. Italian 
cultural policies, however, cannot be understood and analysed in a vacuum; 
they must be contextualised within the broader cultural activities promoted 
by “Italian” religious institutions. While the Italian State and the Catholic 
Church were not just officially separated, but in a state of conflict, their rela-
tionship was much more blurred and entangled outside the borders of Italy. 
In other words, often the distinction between Italian and Roman Catholic 
was rather indistinguishable, allowing the secular cultural diplomacy of the 
state to mingle with the religious-cultural activities of Italian Catholic institu-
tions in Palestine, producing a hybrid form of cultural diplomacy.
While this chapter will mostly rely on the material of the Italian consu-
late in Jerusalem, I will also integrate evidence from religious institutions 
including the Latin Patriarchate and the Custody of the Holy Land. As sec-
ondary literature is rather thin, I will attempt to introduce a model for stud-
ying Italian cultural diplomacy which must take into account the general 
diplomatic leverage. For instance, considering that from 1919 to 1926 seven 
3 A good work showing the various French activities is Dominique Trimbur and Ran 
Aaronsohn, de Bonaparte a’ Balfour. La France, l’Europe occidentale et la Palestine, 1799–1917 
(Paris: CNRS Editions, 2008).
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different consuls led the Italian consulate, we understand that Italian leverage 
was minimal. However, with the appointment of Mario Zanotti Bianchi, and 
later of Orazio Pedrazzi and Mariano de Angelis—covering the period from 
1926 to 1936—Italian diplomacy became more relevant and visible. While 
Italian cultural activities may have become more regular, they did not nec-
essarily prove to be effective. Retrospectively we know that Italian influence 
did not break through as desired, nevertheless it cannot be underestimated or 
neglected: it is not the outcome that matters here, but the journey.
In Search of a WorkIng DefInItIon of cultural DIplomacy
According to Michael Waller, cultural diplomacy is a kind of soft power that 
includes the “exchange of ideas, information, art, language and other aspects 
of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual under-
standing”.4 In the contemporary world cultural diplomacy is a rather loose 
term defining a set of practices by nation states in their relations.5 The pur-
pose is ultimately to influence a foreign audience with the hope of achiev-
ing different goals including cooperation between nations, prevention of 
conflict and building positive views of one another’s countries. Though cul-
tural diplomacy is a fascinating concept, one that may be very useful in under-
standing contemporary relations between Israel, Palestine and the rest of the 
world, I believe it is a concept that cannot be easily applied to the historical 
case presented in this chapter. Cultural diplomacy is based on a two-way dia-
logue, maybe an unbalanced one, yet it presumes a form of dual exchange 
between peers.
In order to problematise and contextualise Italian diplomacy in Palestine 
within a theoretical framework I believe the concept of soft power, coined by 
Joseph Nye, better frames the policies adopted by the Italian government and 
executed at a local level by the Italian consuls in Jerusalem. In a nutshell soft 
power is the ability to shape the preferences of others: this is not merely a 
form of influence, but more a method of persuasion or a way to move peo-
ple by argument.6 Culture is indeed a form of soft power, however, as noted 
by some scholars, cultural attractiveness is not soft power on its own, it is 
a resource deployed in order to achieve defined objectives.7 In other words 
4 Michael J. Walter, “Cultural Diplomacy, Political Influence, and Integrated Strategy,” in 
Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, Counterpropaganda, and Political Warfare, ed. M. J. 
Waller (Washington, DC: Institute of World Politics Press, 2009), 74.
5 A good summary on the state of the research is provided by Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and 
Mark C. Donfried, “The Model of Cultural Diplomacy,” in Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy, 
eds. Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010), 
13–16.
6 Joseph Nye, Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics (Cambridge: Perseus Books, 
2004), 5–6.
7 Ien Ang, Yudihishthir Isar, and Philip Mar, “Cultural Diplomacy: Beyond the National 
Interest?” International Journal of Cultural Policy 21, no. 4 (2015): 368.
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opening Italian schools in Palestine or producing pro-Arab propaganda may 
have been a form of cultural attraction but unless it reached the goals set by 
Italian policymakers, it was not soft power per se. It will be argued later that 
this was the limit of Italian cultural diplomacy in Palestine: the deployment of 
cultural resources was contingent on the inconsistency of the proposed goals, 
therefore they never converted into visible forms of soft power. Essentially, 
Italians confused cultural resources with the behaviour of attraction and, as 
Joseph Nye argued, “excellent wine and cheese do not guarantee attraction to 
France”, so good schools and entertaining broadcasts on Radio Bari did not 
give the Italians the edge over the British.8
At this point, it is quite clear that in order to frame Italian cultural diplo-
macy in Palestine, the given definitions are not entirely useful, and they must 
be adapted to the context. Italian attempts at influencing Palestinians were 
indeed a form of one-directional cultural diplomacy: Italians were not inter-
ested in cultural exchange. This is not to dramatically diminish the value 
of the attempts made, but as we will see later, the range of cultural tools 
employed were never consistently coordinated or arranged in order to achieve 
the goals set. My belief is that there were no clear goals in the first place, and 
in turn this inconsistency produced a random set of cultural policies that may 
have influenced individuals but never reached the potential to impact upon a 
larger community.
More radically I would even question the nature of cultural diplomacy in 
this context as I am not entirely sure this is diplomacy at all; it looks more 
a form of covert imperialism than anything else. If we look at the question 
of agency it is not clear “who is in charge”: the state, the Church, individu-
als, consuls or others? However, for the lack of a better term, in this chapter 
I refer to cultural diplomacy, bearing in mind its intriguing usefulness and 
limitations. The examples discussed in this chapter show that Italian cul-
tural diplomacy was reactive instead of pro-active. For instance, the Alliance 
Française, established in 1883, was created with the purpose of teaching 
French as a language that would inspire in other people an affinity for France 
and above all for the values of the enlightenment; on the other hand the 
Dante Alighieri Society established in 1889 was designed to promote Italian 
culture and language around the world, especially among the expatriate 
Italian community.9 The substantial difference is that while the first pro-ac-
tively sought to influence foreign communities, the latter was instead created 
as a reaction to Italian migration and the potential loss of national identity. 
While it would be impossible to make a more substantial contribution to the 
9 Gienow-Hecth and Donfried, “The Model of Cultural Diplomacy,” 18; Daniela Fabrizio, 
Fascino D’Oriente. Religionie Politica in Medio Oriente da Giolitti a Mussolini (Genoa: Marietti, 
2006), 282–283. On the Dante Alighieri see also T. Van Kessel, Foreign Cultural Policy in 
the Interbellum: The Italian Dante Alighieri Society and the British Council Contesting the 
Mediterranean (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2016).
8 Nye, Soft Power, 12.
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debate over cultural diplomacy and policies, I suggest that in the end, Italian 
cultural policies were enacted with the purpose of strengthening Italian 
national identity rather than projecting national power abroad.10
the ItalIan conSulate In JeruSalem: a Short hIStory
An Italian presence has been visible for centuries in Jerusalem in the form 
of clergy and pilgrims; however, the size of this community did not match 
its political relevance, which was overshadowed by British and French con-
sulates and communities, echoing the relative unimportance of Italy on the 
international stage. The Italian presence in Palestine has been mainly analysed 
through three lenses: the history of Italian religious institutions and person-
nel operating in the Holy Land; the attitude of Italian governments towards 
Palestine and, after 1948, their relationship with Israel and the Arab coun-
tries; lastly some scholars have looked at Italian relations with the Yishuv.11 
Few works have been devoted to the study of the political, economic, social 
and religious networks established by the Italian state in Palestine and the 
connections between the consulate and the complex system of power in 
Jerusalem and the region.12 The lack of historiographical research in Italian 
and other languages is not only a reflection of the absence of primary sources 
before the inventory of the consulate records, but also of the tendency—par-
ticularly evident in the historiography on Jerusalem and Palestine—to dif-
ferentiate and separate the subjects of study into a fragmented picture rather 
than providing an interconnected and wider portrait.
In the only work dedicated to Italian diplomacy in Palestine, Lucia 
Rostagno was right to suggest that we should bear in mind that from Italy, 
Palestine was hard to reach and not included in the colonial dreams of the 
new Italian state, and certainly not a destination for Italian migrants.13 At 
the end of the nineteenth century, Italian interests towards Palestine were 
mainly devotional. In fact, it can safely be said that little was known of the 
10 J. P. Singh, “Global Cultural Policies and Power,” in International Cultural Policies and 
Power, ed. J. P. Singh (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010): 11.
11 See Giuseppe Buffon, Les Franciscains en Terre Sainte (1869–1889). Religion et politique: 
une recherche institutionelle (Paris: Cerf, 2005); Paolo Pieraccini, Cattolici di Terra Santa (1333–
2000) (Florence: Pagnini e Martinelli, 2003); Andrea Giovannelli, La Santa Sede e la Palestina: 
La Custodia di Terra Santa tra la fine dell’impero ottomano e la guerra dei sei giorni (Rome: 
Studium, 2000); Arturo Marzano, Una terra per rinascere: Gli ebrei italiani e l’emigrazione in 
Palestina prima della guerra (1920–1940) (Genoa: Marietti, 2003); Luca Riccardi, Il “problema 
Israele”: Diplomazia italiana e PCI di fronte allo stato ebraico (1948–1973) (Milan: Guerini e 
Associati, 2006); Sergio I. Minerbi, Il Vaticano, la Terra Santa e il Sionismo (Milan: Bompiani, 
1988); Silvio Ferrari, Vaticano e Israele dal secondo conflitto mondiale alla guerra del Golfo 
(Florence: Sansoni, 1991).
12 Rostagno, Terrasanta o Palestina?; Andrea Gabellini, L’Italia e l’assetto della Palestina 
(1916–1924) (Florence: Societá per gli studi sul Medio Oriente, 2000).
13 Rostagno, Terrasanta o Palestina? 12.
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country: Italian Catholics and Jews did not share the same interest in the 
Holy Land as their British, French, or American coreligionists.14 The re-es-
tablishment of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem in 1847 might have had 
triggered a renewed interest, although available evidence does not suggest 
this, and in any case the Terrasanta was an entity to pray for, not to con-
quer.15 Italy had no connection whatsoever with the local Eastern Catholic 
churches—a field left open to the French. The Italian governments saw indig-
enous Catholics as a catalyser to promote and defend the Italian character of 
the Latin Patriarchate and the Custody of the Holy Land (both the Patriarch 
and the Custos were in fact Italian subjects).16 The Salesians had a substantial 
impact in Palestine, working with local inhabitants. Similarly, the Franciscans, 
by far the largest Catholic group in Palestine, provided jobs and services to 
local Christians, Muslims and Jews alike. Politicians and diplomats were still 
far away.17
In 1843, Consul Lenchantin from the Kingdom of Piedmont and Sardinia 
was sent to Jerusalem to protect the interests of its subjects and to challenge 
the French protectorate over Catholics.18 The material available at the state 
archives in Turin has barely been perused by scholars and, together with the 
material recently uncovered at the archives of the Italian foreign ministry, may 
paint a different picture; however, it is safe to say that until 1849—when the 
consulate was “temporarily” closed—Italian diplomatic presence had limited 
influence.19 Adolfo Castellinard, the second Sardinian-Piedmontese consul, 
left Jerusalem in 1849. The seat remained vacant and was filled again only a 
decade after the Italian unification process was completed.
The newly created Kingdom of Italy could not afford a wide and sophisti-
cated diplomatic network. The lack of trained and trusted diplomatic officials 
was paired with the imperative on Minister of Finance Quintino Sella to avoid 
14 It is important to highlight that though Italians were not interested in relocating to 
Palestine, attention to the Holy Land was voiced through Vatican publications. It is often hard 
to differentiate between Vatican and Italian sources as both were written in Italian and Catholics 
were split over loyalty to the State or the Church. See also Paolo Maggiolini’s chapter in this 
volume.
15 See Paolo Pieraccini, Il ristabilimento del patriarcato latino di Gerusalemme e la custodia 
di Terra Santa. La dialettica istituzionale al tempo del primo patriarca mons. Giuseppe Valerga 
(1847–1872) (Cairo: Franciscan Center of Christian Oriental Studies, 2006).
16 See Giovannelli, La Santa Sede.
17 Simonetta della Seta, “La Presenza e l’Opera dei Salesiani in Palestina,” Storia 
Contemporanea 20, no. 1 (1989): 81–101.
18 Archivio Storico Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASDMAE) Consolato 
Gerusalemme, Pacco 1 (old catalogue), note written in 1897 with a short history of the con-
suls in Jerusalem. Details of Lenchantin can be found in Giuseppe Alessandro Piola Caselli, 
Cronache Marinare (1843–1883), ed. Federico Adamoli, www.piolacaselli.altervista.org/cro-
nache-marinare/Cronache%20Marinare%20con%20Indice.pdf.
19 Material related to the Consulate of the Kingdom of Sardinia and Piedmont in Jerusalem can 
also be found in ASMAE, Consolato Gerusalemme, Pacco 9 (old catalogue).
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a deficit in the budget of the nascent state. However, members of the Italian 
parliament were fully convinced of the necessity of opening a consulate in the 
holy city.20 Eventually, an agreement was made, and Vice-Consul Alessandro 
de Rege di Donato was appointed consul in Jerusalem on 15 November 
1871. Like his seven successors until the outbreak of the First World War, 
di Donato had no deep knowledge of the region, or its languages, religions 
and peoples. It must be said, however, that the earliest Sardinian consuls 
had more experience in the region, as both Lenchantin and Castellinard 
had served as consuls in the Ottoman Empire before their appointment 
to Jerusalem.21 It was only in 1911, with the impeding Italian invasion of 
Libya, that the Italian Orientalist Leone Caetani passionately petitioned the 
Italian parliament and the foreign ministry to support the Oriental Institute 
in Naples as a place to forge young diplomats serving in the East.22 Rostagno 
suggests that the existing consuls had no interest in local society, which never 
featured in their reports; however, new material may readdress this view and 
paint a more nuanced picture. A local dimension seems to emerge in the 
registers of correspondence with Constantinople, as many letters deal with 
local issues, particularly complaints against petty crime committed by local 
inhabitants.23
A major change occurred with the appointment of Carlo Senni in May 
1907. Though not an Orientalist, the young consul was a careful observer 
and, in his reports, gathered increasing amounts of information about the 
local communities and their intra- and interrelations.24 Senni reported on 
indigenous religious communities at length, offering suggestions on how 
to engage with them. Some of his comments may look naïve or poorly 
informed, as he did not possess a deep knowledge of local politics. However, 
the fact that he was not involved in any major local dispute or in any major 
scheme to control one or more groups provides a perspective that can con-
tribute nuance to what we know of local politics and dynamics.25 Senni also 
provides invaluable information about Jerusalem during the First World War, 
as he remained in the city until the spring of 1915, reporting on a variety of 
22 Rostagno, Terrasanta o Palestina? 27.
23 ASDMAE, Consolato Gerusalemme, Pacco 3 (old catalogue), Resigter Correspondence with 
Constantinople 1872–1892. Some miscellaneous registers in the same folder suggest a growing 
interest in the local economy, as more Italians became interested in opening businesses or dealing 
with local businessmen. However, the scope of this commercial activity at the end of the nine-
teenth century was small compared to other European countries.
24 Details of Carlo Senni can be found at: notes9.senato.it/web/senregno.nsf/d973a7c86861
8f05c125711400382868/ea6b98faa6aaa56a4125646f0060866f?OpenDocument, last modified 
March 21, 2017.
25 See ASDMAE, Consolato Gerusalemme, Pacco 8 (old catalogue), Local and Foreign 
Religious Communities.
20 Rostagno, Terrasanta o Palestina? 22–23.
21 See Adamoli, Cronache Marinare.
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subjects.26 As Senni left Jerusalem upon the Italian declaration of war against 
the Ottoman Empire, it is possible to say that he made the Italian presence 
in the region more relevant and at the same time brought Jerusalem and 
Palestine closer to Italy and Italians.
With the end of the war, Senni returned to Jerusalem for a short time, 
but everything had changed. Now the British were in control and the Italian 
government was involved in redrawing the Middle East. Despite the increased 
role of Italian diplomacy in Palestine, both the British and French margin-
alised Italy, which they saw more as a nuisance than a challenge.27 Italian 
diplomacy, meanwhile, was unable to react quickly to the changes occurring 
in Palestine. Between 1919 and 1926, seven different consuls led the Italian 
consulate. Copies of the reports sent to Rome show the lack of diplomatic 
initiative and a generally superficial understanding of events unfolding in 
Palestine and Jerusalem, including the emerging national struggle between 
Arabs and Zionists. This diplomatic weakness was a reflection of Italian 
politics, as the fascist regime was slowly taking over. It is in 1926, with the 
appointment of Mario Zanotti Bianchi, that Italian diplomatic efforts became 
more substantial and visible.28
Jerusalem and Palestine came to play a more important role for Italian 
diplomacy and politics. As Mussolini aimed at extending Italian influ-
ence over the Mediterranean as part of his dream to make Italy an empire, 
Palestine became a battleground against British influence in the region.29 One 
of the most interesting consuls yet to be fully analysed is Orazio Pedrazzi. 
Appointed in February 1927, Pedrazzi was not a diplomat by profession, 
but a journalist and an expert on Middle Eastern politics. He probably had 
a direct line to Mussolini and in his short tenure he emphasised the neces-
sity of working with the Zionists, as they were going to dictate the future 
of Palestine. Though he was an anti-Zionist and Arabophobe, his main con-
cern was to challenge British rule and thus he lost his job rather quickly. 
After Pedrazzi left, on the eve of the Western Wall riots of 1929, Mussolini 
changed direction and his support for the Arab-Palestinian cause became 
more visible in terms of propaganda and help for local Palestinian elites. It 
would be interesting to discover in the papers of the consulate in Jerusalem 
the extent and quality of Italian-Zionist relations, which certainly did not 
altogether cease.30
The man who helped bring some local Arabs to the Italian side was 
Mariano De Angelis. Appointed consul in 1932, De Angelis served until 
26 See ASDMAE, Consolato Gerusalemme, Pacco 10 (old catalogue), various correspondence 
in relation to the outbreak of the First World War.
27 Gabellini, L’Italia e l’assetto della Palestina.
28 Rostagno, Terrasanta o Palestina? 136.
29 Arielli, Fascist Italy.
30 Arielli, Fascist Italy, 20–21.
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1936 and worked publicly and secretly to transform anti-Italian sentiments 
among the Arabs into feelings of sympathy. At the same time, De Angelis 
looked with favour on Jabotinsky and his hard-line Zionists. Though 
Mussolini never met Jabotinsky, it would be interesting to discover more 
about this relationship.31 Many works have dealt with the emergence of 
the alliance between Mussolini and the Mufti of Jerusalem, al-Hajj Amin 
al-Husayni, and it is clear that Mussolini had to adopt different policies in 
Libya and show a stronger commitment towards Arabs and Muslims in order 
to gain his friendship and to transform anti-Italian sentiments. By 1933, 
De Angelis had a good relationship with the Mufti, and we hope the papers 
available in Rome may give us more details about the ways in which the shift 
occurred. De Angelis also wrote extensively about the possibility of an agree-
ment between the Arabs and the Zionists and he hoped to see Mussolini 
become a peacemaker.32
De Angelis left on the eve of the 1936–1939 revolt and Quinto Mazzolini 
succeeded him until the consulate was closed with the outbreak of the war 
between Italy and Great Britain. The years of the Revolt marked strong 
Italian support for the Palestinian cause, but Italian propaganda was ulti-
mately unsuccessful in turning the Palestinians against the British. The exam-
ple of Radio Bari is illuminating: Arabic-language radio broadcasts targeting 
Palestine and Transjordan were heavily criticised by the British, who feared 
the local population’s rebellion against colonial power. But though Arab 
listeners enjoyed programs in Arabic, it is also true that Radio Bari was not 
effective in its political mission, as we will see later and in more detail.33
pre-faScISt Italy cultural DIplomacy In paleStIne
In 1920 Chaim Weizmann, writing to Lord Curzon, noted that “in Palestine 
the Vatican and the Secular Italian Government seem to be identical. The 
cleavage that exists in Rome is not apparent in Jerusalem”.34 Weizmann’s 
observation was indeed right, for decades Italy struggled to establish a more 
permanent foothold in Palestine through Catholic institutions and clergy. 
By 1905, with Tommaso Tittoni as Foreign Minister, Italy officially adopted 
the same approach employed by the French that anticlericalism would never 
31 ASDMAE, Ap, Palestina, Busta 13, Roma, 4 November 1935. Jabotinsky was refused a 
meeting with Mussolini several times, however De Angelis wrote a memo suggesting that it was 
important to assist and favour Zionist revisionism as it was in the interests of the Italian gov-
ernment to support a form of Zionism clearly opposed to the official Zionism sponsored by the 
British government.
32 ASDMAE, Ap, Palestina, Busta 8, Gerusalemme, 21 Mach 1934.
33 Andrea Stanton, This Is Jerusalem Calling (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2013), 
94–101. The history of Radio Bari is also discussed by Marzano, Onde fasciste.
34 Weizmann to Lord Curzon, 2 February 1920, The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, 
Vol. IX (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1977), 297–298.
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become un article d’exportation.35 In 1911 Senni suggested joining the con-
cession to build a railway between Jerusalem and Beisan. His intention was 
to support the possible establishment of Italian agricultural settlements in 
Palestine; however, the proposal was not followed through because of the 
outbreak of the Italian-Ottoman war on Libya.36 The post-unitarian state did 
not have the funds or the expertise to really invest in Palestine as the British 
and the French did. Foreign policy in the region was an example of the rare 
collaboration between the Italian state—highly anticlerical—and pro-Catho-
lic sectors within Italian society and politics. Italian diplomats in Jerusalem, 
regardless of their expertise and political affiliation, had a vested interest in 
the Catholic institutions operating in the region as they all recognised that 
the only way to establish a relevant presence was through Catholic institu-
tions and Italian clergy. The idea was to undermine the traditional French 
position as protector of Catholics in the Holy Land.37
Italian consuls in Jerusalem operated in two ways: first they provided legal 
assistance required by Italian institutions, and secondly tried to financially 
support educational institutions and to facilitate the establishment of private 
Italian businesses. However, the reality was that a lack of funding and of an 
organic plan to develop an Italian presence in Palestine set the consuls on a 
collision course with the Italian government. As noted by Pieraccini and 
Fabrizio, the success of the Italian schools in Palestine was minimal, not only 
because of the lack of students but also because of the lack of clear knowl-
edge of the region and support from Rome. The largest Italian community in 
Palestine, for instance, was to be found in Haifa, yet it was forgotten in favour 
of Jerusalem and Jaffa.38 This was indeed one of the limits of Italian diplomacy 
in Palestine, as its association with religious institutions did not allow Italian 
officials to see the potential for soft power where it was more likely to succeed.
Not much changed with the establishment of the Fascist regime in 1922. 
Mussolini was still as interested in building an empire in Africa as his liberal 
35 Paolo Pieraccini, “The External Cultural and Linguistic Policy of the Italian Government 
in the Mediterranean Region and the Issue of the National Association for Aid to Missionaries 
(1886–1905),” in Linguistic and Cultural Foreign Policies of European States: 18th–20th Centuries, 
eds. Karène Sanchez-Summerer and Willem Frijhoff (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 
2017), 110.
36 ASDMAE, Busta 745, Ap. Miscellaneous, Senni to Di San Giuliano, Jerusalem, 30 May 
1911.
37 A good summary of the French work to protect and foster its position in Palestine is given 
by Dominique Trimbur, “Les Liuex Saints Chrétiens de Palestine comme Préoccupation de la 
Politique Extérieure Française (1917–1948),” in Diplomatie et Religion. Au Couer de l’Action 
Culturelle de la France au XXe Siècle, eds. Gilles Ferragu and Florian Michel (Paris: Publication 
de la Sorbonne, 2016), 173–189.
38 In 1923 a petition was sent to Mussolini by the members of the Italian colony in Haifa sug-
gesting they were a ‘gregge senza pastore’ (a people without a leader). ASDMAE, Affari Politici, 
Palestina, Pacco 1458, Fasc. 6292, petition of the Italian Patriotic Association Haifa, Haifa, 28 
August 1923.
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predecessors. Rumours were circulating about the possibility of Rome taking 
over the Palestine Mandate, a notion supported by Catholics and national-
ists, but there is no evidence suggesting Mussolini endorsed the idea, if the 
British would have ever thought of relinquishing their hold.39 The appoint-
ment of Orazio Pedrazzi as consul in Jerusalem in 1927 suggests a change 
of course in the Italian attempt to influence Palestine. Pedrazzi, who was a 
journalist and a so-called expert in Middle Eastern affairs, told Mussolini that 
there was a new Palestine emerging after the Great War: it was the Zionists 
who were going to change the country. Pedrazzi believed it was imperative 
for the Italians to deploy cultural diplomacy, and indeed economic meas-
ures, in order to work with the Jews “whether we like it or not”.40 In the 
material perused so far, it is interesting to note that Pedrazzi essentially 
ignored Palestinian nationalism. Pedrazzi demonstrated the inconsistency of 
the Italian approach to Palestine: while openly supporting Zionism, he sup-
ported the Latin Patriarch Barlassina—openly anti-Zionist—but criticised 
the Pope and his approach towards the local Christian Churches. The Italian 
consul believed that the Vatican policy of supporting the local clergy and the 
Arabisation of the Church was an open challenge against the Italian character 
of Catholic institutions in Palestine.41 How, then, could a set of cultural poli-
cies be developed and implemented in light of this inconsistency? Liberals and 
early Fascists were all trapped into a loophole that limited any form of cultural 
diplomacy.
In order to show the limits and potential of Italian cultural diplomacy I 
present two small examples. The first case illustrates that despite the attention 
paid to cultural institutions like schools, consuls were better trained to care 
for the legal necessities of the same institutions. The second example shows 
the failure of the first fully funded and developed operation of cultural diplo-
macy through the opening of the Italian hospital in Jerusalem. Unfortunately, 
due to the war against the Ottomans over Libya in 1911 and later the out-
break of the First World War, the hospital never functioned as such and 
changed hands through the decades. Yet its architecture is still a visible sign 
of the attempt to influence Oriental culture.
“La Strada Delle Suore”
While perusing the papers of the Italian consulate in Jerusalem for the early 
years of the twentieth century it is striking to note how legal and other petty 
issues kept Italian officials busy. In 1901 the Italian government supported 
the opening of two colonial schools, one in Jaffa and one in Jerusalem. In 
order to avoid Ottoman restrictions on national institutions, Fr. Giannini, 
39 Arielli, Fascist Italy, 20.
40 ASDMEA, Affari Politici, Busta 1460, Pedrazzi to Mussolini, Jerusalem, 19 May 1927.
41 See Giorgio del Zanna, Roma e l’Oriente. Leone XIII e l’Impero Ottomano (Milan: Guerini e 
Associati, 2003), 290–330.
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the Custos of the Custody of the Holy Land, collaborated with the secular 
authorities in order to open these schools.42 While the school in Jerusalem 
never opened, the one in Jaffa was quite successful. The Italian authorities 
were hoping to create a school for Italians, but eventually the largest num-
ber of pupils were subjects of other countries, mainly local Ottomans.43 In 
1912 consul Senni requested Italian flags for the schools in Palestine. The 
ministry eventually sent ten.44 These are indeed small examples of policies 
aiming at culturally influencing the region, yet the largest file in the same 
box is dedicated to a legal matter that may have compromised access to the 
Italian female school in Jaffa. In a sense this mirrors the weaknesses of Italian 
attempts at cultural diplomacy. Consular attention shifted often towards those 
areas in which they were most likely to be successful.
On 10 November 1910 Sister Maria Rufina, the superior of the Italian 
girls’ school in Jaffa, contacted the Italian consul in Jerusalem reporting on 
a matter of urgency. This related to the attempt by Osman Nashashibi to 
close the road where the school was located in order to expand his proper-
ty.45The question was a legal one that included decisions taken by the munic-
ipality and the Meclis Idare (administrative council).46 The consulate provided 
Sister Rufina with legal and monetary help, yet Senni came to realise that the 
question was becoming a religious issue since the majority of the personnel at 
the administrative court in Jaffa was Muslim. Senni and the consular agent in 
Jaffa, Alonzo, also realised that there were internal political battles between 
the various administrative units and the Nashashibi family. The story is rather 
long and tedious but revealing of the low-level priorities of Italian officials in 
Palestine. Daniela Fabrizio is right to remind us that the Italian consuls until 
the end of the 1920s fully applied the principles of prudent initiatives and 
realistic ambitions: not exactly what was needed for the successful develop-
ment of cultural diplomacy.47
The Italian Hospital (Building)
While busy with the “strada delle suore” in Jaffa, the Italian consul was also 
occupied with one of the most visible forms of cultural diplomacy employed 
42 ASDMAE, Pacco 11 (old catalogue), Italian Foreign Office to Italian Consul Scaniglia, 
Rome, 20 August 1900. More details about this are to be found in Fabrizio, Fascino D’Oriente, 
285–290.
43 ASDMAE, Italian Consulate Jerusalem, Busta 11, Fasc. 75.
44 ASDMAE, Pacco 11 (old catalogue), Senni to Italian Foreign Office, Jerusalem, 16 
December 1912. The reply from Tittoni to Senni, Rome, 7 March 1913.
45 ASDMAE, Pacco 11 (old catalogue), Suor Maria Rufina to Carlo Senni, Jaffa, 10 November 
1910.
46 Details of the administrative Ottoman structure can be found in Johann Büssow, Hamidian 
Palestine Politics and Society in the District of Jerusalem 1872–1908 (Leiden: Brill, 2011).
47 Fabrizio, Fascino D’Oriente, 36.
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by the Italians: the construction of a hospital in the shape of a renaissance 
building, very similar to Palazzo Vecchio in Florence.48 This was a major 
diplomatic operation that required the consulate to deal with the Ottoman 
administration and with the Associazione per Soccorrere i Missionari Italiani 
all’Estero (The National Association for Aid to Missionaries) that operated 
in lieu of the consulate. The history of the Italian hospital is a complicated 
one as its erection was first paused due to the Italian-Ottoman war over 
Libya in 1911, and later by the outbreak of the First World War. The hos-
pital had been designed by the famous Italian architect Antonio Barluzzi, 
together with his brother Giulio, and was meant to bring a flavour of Italy 
to Palestine.49 Senni, writing to the Italian Ambassador in Constantinople in 
March 1915—just a few weeks before Italy joined the war—noted that the 
inauguration of the hospital had been postponed as a result of the war.50 
Eventually the hospital changed hands several times before becoming part of 
the Israeli Ministry of Education after 1948. The virtual absence of informa-
tion about this building and of literature dedicated to it is a sign of the failed 
attempt of the Italians to establish a health institution which was not only 
meant to provide medical attention to the local population and Italian resi-
dents, but through its design was meant to symbolise a visible Italian presence 
and influence.
faScISt cultural DIplomacy In paleStIne 1934–1939
On 18 March 1934 Mussolini, while delivering a speech to the Fascist Party 
assembly in Rome, stated: “of all the great Western Powers of Europe the 
nearest to Africa and to Asia is Italy. A few hours by sea, fewer still by air, 
suffice to join Italy to Africa and to Asia …. It is not a matter of territorial 
conquests … but of a natural expansion which should lead to collaboration 
between Italy and the nations of the Near and Middle East”.51
This is generally understood as the watershed of Italian activity in the 
Middle East: from reactive and limited intervention, to pro-active, visible 
and tangible forms of propaganda and direct involvement. Scholars, however 
are divided over the general assessment of Italian intervention in the Middle 
East in the 1930s. Italian academics tend to suggest that Arab nationalism 
and local Arab forces—as in the case of the Mufti of Jerusalem—were used 
as pawns in order to reach a general understanding with the British over 
48 ASDMAE, Italian Consulate Jerusalem, Busta 17, Fasc. 79, Ospedale di Gerusalemme.
49 Masha Halevi, “A Pious Architect and an Italian Nationalist: Antonio Barluzzi and His 
Activism in Promoting the Italian Interests in the Holy Land,” Cathedra 144 (2012): 75–106 
(Hebrew).
50 ASDMAE, Pacco 11 (old catalogue), Senni to Marchese Garroni, Jerusalem, 20 March 
1915.
51 India Office Record (IOR), L/PS/12/107/2629, ‘Mussolini’s speech at the Quinquennial 
Fascist Assembly,’ Rome, 18 March 1934.
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control of the Mediterranean. More recent Italian scholarship and Anglo-
Saxons historians, on the other hand, argue that Mussolini had real imperial 
aspirations in the Mediterranean, seeking to make Italy a hegemonic power 
in the Middle East.52 While I cannot here engage in the interpretation of 
Fascist policies in the region, I believe Mussolini certainly tried to reach a 
general understanding with the British, but in the end Fascism was an impe-
rialist ideology as suggested by the implementation of a series of cultural pol-
icies with the intent of favouring Italian imperial expansion. The major shift 
that occurred between 1933 and 1934 saw Mussolini and Fascist Italy sup-
porting Arab nationalism and the rise of pro-Muslim policies. It is impor-
tant to remember that this change has to be contextualised within the Fascist 
attempt to reconquer and legitimise rule over Libya. Since 1934 the Italian 
governor of Libya, Italo Balbo, pursued pro-Muslim policies in order to 
pacify the country and effectively gain consensus. These ranged from open-
ing new mosques to maintaining high levels of hygiene in Islamic schools. 
Essentially these policies were designed to turn Libya from a source of embar-
rassment to source of pride for Italy.53 The link between Libya and Palestine 
was a loose one and interests were different as Libya needed to remain calm, 
while Palestine should be “set on fire” in order to challenge the British. Yet, 
pro-Muslim policies in Libya certainly had the effect of showing Palestinian 
Muslims Italy’s goodwill and different colonial style.
The inconsistency of this approach, however, was of a greater magnitude. 
In 1934, while Mussolini began to flirt with Arab nationalists, including 
Hajj Amin al-Husayni in Jerusalem, he also met the leaders of the Zionist 
Movement including Chaim Weizmann. At some points Mussolini had 
no problems calling himself both the protector of Islam and the protec-
tor of the Jews.54 However, throughout the 1920s Italian cultural activities 
also focussed on winning the hearts of local Christians in order to showcase 
“the new Italy” created in the post-war era.55 This might have been true in 
general, but looking at Palestine we can certainly see a total lack of under-
standing, knowledge and relationships with the Melkite Church. Despite rep-
resenting the largest local Arabic-speaking Catholic community, they were 
largely ignored. While defending the Italian character of the Catholic Church 
in Palestine, Italians essentially missed an opportunity to develop forms of 
cultural influence which might have found fertile ground. While this chap-
ter cannot present a full analysis and assessment of Fascist cultural policies in 
52 A good summary of this debate is in Arielli, Fascist Italy, 1–3.
53 Arielli, Fascist Italy, 96–97.
54 Claudio Segré, “Liberal and Fascist Italy in the Middle East, 1919–1939,” in The Great 
Powers and the Middle East 1919–1939, ed. Uriel Dann (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988), 
207.
55 M. G. Pasqualini, Gli Equilibri nel Levante (Palermo: Edizioni Associate, 1995), 146; M. 
Tedeschini Lalli, “La Propoganda Araba del Fascismo e l’Egitto,” Storia Contemporanea 7, no. 6 
(1976): 722.
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Palestine, I briefly show two examples demonstrating the weakness of Italian 
cultural propaganda, bearing in mind that the failure of Italian Fascist cul-
tural diplomacy was not a weakness on its own but part of the larger failure 
of Fascist foreign politics. The first example is Radio Bari and the second one 
Italian relations with Zionism and the Jewish community in Palestine.
Radio Bari
Radio Bari was established in 1932 during the third Levant Fair, with an orig-
inal purpose of broadcasting in Albanian and Greek, showing a clear inter-
est in the Balkans.56 Broadcasts in Arabic began only in 1934 as a result of 
the changing attitude of the Fascist regime towards North Africa and the 
Middle East. The purpose of these broadcasts was to increase Italian influ-
ence in the Mediterranean and throughout the Middle East and secondly to 
strengthen the ties between Italy and the Arab people.57 Theses radio shows 
certainly fall into the category of cultural propaganda, as Italians were try-
ing to restore their image in the Arab-Islamic world following the Senussi 
massacres, and secondly they wanted to show their interest in the region 
despite the attempt by Britain and France to overshadow Italy and the Fascist 
regime.58 The newscast aired on 24 May 1934, for instance, included a dis-
cussion of the Arab Fair in Jerusalem, emphasising its positive results and 
large attendance—a clear attempt to gain local attention.59 There is a good 
body of literature on Radio Bari, however the only full analysis has been pro-
vided in Italian by Arturo Marzano who argued that we should think about 
Radio Bari and its broadcasts in terms of soft power.60 Radio Bari became the 
flagship of Italian propaganda in the Middle East and crucially in Palestine 
which was getting closer to a major outbreak of violence. The lack of compe-
tition, as noted by scholars discussing Radio Bari, essentially enabled Italians 
to reach large audiences. Is this a good criterion to look at the level of influ-
ence? Obviously not. For instance the popular Palestinian newspaper Filastin 
in an article published in 1938—when the Arab Revolt was already raging 
in Palestine—suggested that Arabic-language programs were welcomed, yet 
“the worst that we ate of this propaganda is the allegation that Radio Bari 
[has] all that influence over the movement in Palestine”.61
56 Marzano, Onde Fasciste, 44.
57 Callum A. MacDonald, “Radio Bari: Italian Wireless Propaganda in the Middle East and 
British Countermeasures 1934–38,” Middle Eastern Studies 13, no. 2 (May 1977): 195.
58 MacDonald, “Radio Bari”, 195.
59 Marzano, Onde Fasciste, 45; on the Arab Fair in Jerusalem see the chapter by Nisa Ari in 
this volume and Nadi Abusaada, “Self-Portrait of a Nation: The Arab Exhibition in Mandate 
Jerusalem, 1931–34,” Jerusalem Quarterly, no. 77 (2019): 122–135.
60 Marzano, Onde Fasciste, 19.
61 Filastin, “We Do Not Need This or That,” January 7, 1938. (Arabic).
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In the end Radio Bari does not appear to have played a key role in turn-
ing Palestinians against the British.62 While from 1935 broadcasts became 
more and more anti-British in nature, possibly causing the audience to turn 
away from Italian propaganda, Radio Bari did not lose its appeal as the cul-
tural shows aired were still favoured by Arab listeners.63 These broadcasts 
included lectures from al-Azhar scholars on the history of Islam and legal 
topics. A number of conversations, in Arabic, discussed Italian and Arabic lit-
erature. The largest audience was probably captured through music as Radio 
Bari played a mix of Italian, classical and Arabic music, including numer-
ous hits by Umm Kulthum.64 These broadcasts were part of the pro-Mus-
lim policies enacted in Libya and the Islamic world in order to gain support 
by showing the good face of Italian colonialism. Broadcasts were also fol-
lowed by the activity of local Italian officials. For instance the Italian con-
sul Quinto Mazzolini, in December 1936, was able to avoid the publication 
by Al- Jamayya al-Islamiyya—published in Jaffa—of a special issue attacking 
Italian colonialism in Abyssinia.65 In 1937 Mazzolini tried once again to win 
the hearts of the Palestinians by suggesting free access to the agricultural and 
crafts schools in Italian Africa for Palestinians.66 The response was negative 
as the governor of Libya, Balbo, believed that bringing Palestinians to Libya 
might have inflamed local nationalism, showing that political propaganda was 
a dangerous business.67
While political propaganda essentially failed, cultural broadcasts proved to 
be very successful. The high standard of entertainment and the attention to 
the Arabic used proved to be very effective for Radio Bari. The British, as 
they themselves admitted, were simply not capable of keeping up with the 
quality of the shows.68 Italy was indeed succeeding in presenting its new 
image as a positive one. Radio Bari was able to air programs that would 
merge Italian and Arabic culture together, yet we need to remember that 
Italians looked at Arabs with a sense of Orientalism that often, as noted by 
Marzano, blended the various broadcasts: in other words cultural diplomacy 
was once again a one-way direction.69 Italy embarrassed London as their 
62 Stanton, This Is Jerusalem Calling, 100.
63 MacDonald, “Radio Bari,” 195–207.
64 See Marzano, Onde Fasciste, 181–197.
65 ASDMEA, Affari Politici, Palestina, Busta 30. Mazzolini to Foreign and Propaganda 
Ministries, Jerusalem, 4 December 1936.
66 ASDMEA, Affari Politici, Palestina, Busta 15, Mazzolini to Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, 27 
May 1937.
67 ASDMEA, Affari Politici, Palestine Busta 15, Ciano to Mazzolini, Rome, 29 October 1937.
68 TNA PRO FO 395/560, ‘BBC: Overseas Intelligence Department’ and TNA PRO FO 
395/561, ‘The British Broadcasting Corporation: The Arabic Broadcasts’, London, September 
1938.
69 Marzano, Onde Fasciste, 180.
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programs were better and more successful, yet I would argue that focussing 
on “la bella figura”—the appearance rather than the impact—did not bring 
any positive result. While their broadcasts may have been indeed very good, 
they never scratched the surface and Italy was never seriously considered to 
replace Britain in Palestine.
The Protector of the Jews
As mentioned above, in the early years of the Fascist regime Mussolini looked 
upon Zionism with some favour. He met the leading figures of the Zionist 
movement and several times made statements suggesting Italy was in favour 
of the establishment of a Jewish entity in Palestine.70 Things obviously 
changed in 1938 with the adoption of racial laws against the Jews, but more 
importantly in our context with the massive increase of anti-Semitic propa-
ganda spread through Radio Bari.71 Anti-Semitism was not unknown in Italy 
before 1938, but it often remained within Catholic circles.
In this section I want to show the attempts made by the Italian gov-
ernment to create a cultural nexus with the Jewish-Zionist community in 
Palestine. As we saw earlier the major shift occurred with the appointment of 
Orazio Pedrazzi as consul in Jerusalem. The Zionist press believed Pedrazzi 
to be anti-Zionist as proven by the large number of articles published in sev-
eral languages upon his appointment.72 Pedrazzi, as mentioned earlier, real-
ised the importance of collaborating with the Zionists if the Italians were to 
have some sort of influence in the region. The idea of establishing a network 
of Italian Jewish institutions around the Mediterranean, with an Italian school 
in Jerusalem, predates the arrival of Pedrazzi.73 However Italian Jews were 
not well organised, and these ideas remained as such.
The material in the archives of the Italian consulate in Jerusalem offers us a 
snapshot of various cultural operations designed by the Italians to strengthen 
their position in Palestine through the Zionist movement. For instance the 
Italians participated with a pavilion at the Levant Fair in Tel Aviv between 
1934 and 1939.74 In 1935 Consul De Angelis and the President of the 
70 An interesting chapter on Mussolini and Zionism has been written by De Felice who argued 
that Mussolini distinguished between Italian Zionism and International Zionism, the first was to 
be mistrusted, the latter to be supported. Renzo de Felice, Il Fascismo e l’Oriente (Padua: Luni 
Editrice, 2018), 125–186 (reprint).
71 Marzano, Onde Fasciste, 209–232.
72 For Instance: Palestine Bullettin, “Signor Pedrazzi Defines His Attitude Towards British 
Mandate and Zionism,” Jerusalem, 15 April 1927; Israël, ‘L’Italie et la Palestine’, 6 May 1927; 
The Sentinel, “Italian Fascism and its Attitude to Zionism,” 13 May 1927.
73 Fabrizio, Fascino D’Oriente, 374–376.
74 ASDMAE, Italian Consulate Jerusalem, Fasc. 190, Busta 28, ‘Fiera del Levante a Tel Aviv 
1935–1939.’
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Italian Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem, Ruffo, argued that Italy should 
invest in a visible presence considering that Jewish Palestinian industry was 
going to be present at the Levant Fair in Bari.75 Eventually Italy did not par-
ticipate in 1936 as a result of the international sanctions following its inva-
sion of Ethiopia, yet Italians were still very much interested and in 1937 once 
again displayed their products.76 One may wonder why this participation was 
important for the Italian regime. Perhaps this was part of the larger effort to 
expand Italian influence; besides, Mussolini, while visiting the Levant Fair in 
Bari in 1934, “displayed deep interest in the exhibit of Palestine products and 
asked for detailed information on the development of Tel Aviv, the new har-
bour at Haifa and on the situation of the German Jews in Palestine”.77
While economic activities followed the international context, cultural 
diplomacy was much more unrestricted. Unsolicited, Professor Chaim Wardi 
wrote on 25 June 1931 from Turin to the Italian consul in relation to the 
possibility of opening an Italian cultural centre in Tel Aviv. The same idea 
was expressed by Nahum Labunsky.78 The initiative was also supported by 
the mayor of Tel Aviv, Dizengoff. It is quite obvious that the Italian gov-
ernment was trying in some way to tap into the Zionist movement, how-
ever it was also clear that this was part of a larger effort to develop forms 
of Italian cultural penetration in Palestine.79 While De Angelis investigated 
Wardi and Labunsky, he was able to gather the necessary funds to open an 
Italian Library in Tel Aviv. On 30 December 1932 the Circolo degli Amici 
della Cultura Italiana was officially established in Tel Aviv, including a small 
library in 46 Jona Hanovi Street.80 A year later De Angelis acknowledged 
the success of the operation, however he also asked for more material to be 
sent to the Italian library as it would be beneficial to the circulation of Italian 
culture and fascist ideology in Palestine.81 While the extent of the success of 
the Circolo and the library is not clear, we may speculate it had some impact 
on the Jews of Tel Aviv considering the various activities promoted, ranging 
from academic lectures to entertainment like music and dances. In 1938 the 
75 ASDMEA, Italian Consulate Jerusalem, Fasc. 190, Busta 28, De Angelis to Foreign Office 
Rome, Jerusalem, 21 August 1935.
76 ASDMAE, Italian Consulate Jerusalem, Fasc. 190, Busta 28, De Angelis to the Direction of 
the Levant Fair, Jerusalem, 15 May 1936.
77 Jewish Daily Bulletin, New York, September 7, 1934.
78 ASDMAE, Italian Consulate Jerusalem, Fasc. 415, Busta 53, Chaim Wardi to Italian Consul, 
Turin, 25 June 1931. See also Labunsky to Italian Consul, Rome, 27 June 1931.
79 ASDMAE, Italian Consulate Jerusalem, Fasc. 415, Busta 53, ‘Circolo degli Amici della 
Cultura Italiana’ 1931–1934.
80 ASMAE, Italian Consulate Jerusalem, Fasc. 415, Busta 53, Report on the opening of the 
‘Circolo degli Amici della Cultura Italiana,’ Tel Aviv, 30 December 1932. Honorary president 
was the Consul, Vice President Yakir Behar, Secretary Nahum Labunsky and Treasurer Chaim 
Wardi.
81 ASMAE, Italian Consulate Jerusalem, Fasc. 415, Busta 53, De Angelis to Foreign Office 
Rome, Jerusalem, 24 January 1933.
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Circolo degli Amici closed as a result of the racial laws: funding and material 
were diverted to the opening of the Dante Alighieri Cultural Institute.
Parallel to the activities of the Circolo is the offer made by Israel Heller, 
a Palestinian-Jewish student at the University of Pavia, who contacted the 
secretary of the Fascist Student Organisation in Milan in 1932.82 Heller was 
offering to spread cultural propaganda to the Jews and non-Jews of Palestine, 
in order to disseminate fascist values and to make Italian fascism known 
abroad through the creation of “circoli” (clubs). The proposal was evalu-
ated at the highest levels of the fascist government, yet the Italian vice-con-
sul in Haifa, D’Acunzo, and the general consul in Jerusalem, Gabrielli, while 
praising Heller, acknowledged the complex divisions emerging in Palestine. 
Gabrielli made it clear that considering the demographics, it was important 
for the Italians to influence the Zionist movement, but at the same time not 
to show clear support for it.83 While Gabrielli believed the action of indi-
viduals was important, the consul insisted that Italian cultural propaganda 
should be developed through the existing institutions—including the Circolo 
degli Amici della Cultura Italiana—but more importantly through Jewish 
schools where fascism could be spread while teaching Italian. Gabrielli openly 
acknowledged that it was important to link fascism with the revisionist ideas 
of Jabotinsky. Italians indeed invested a considerable amount of money and 
efforts in teaching Italian in Jewish schools, however in 1938 with the prom-
ulgation of the racial laws the relationship between the Italian government 
and Zionist-Jewish organisations and institutions in Palestine ceased, showing 
once again the inconsistency of Italian cultural diplomacy.
concluSIon
From the 1930s onwards Italian cultural efforts and propaganda in Palestine 
created a lively buzz among Arabs and Jews: Italy was talked about a great 
deal. Movies, newsreels, magazine, newspapers, cultural events and Radio Bari 
broadcasts reached a vast audience, yet, as Claudio Segré argued “to be talked 
about is not necessarily to be respected or admired”.84 Italian cultural activ-
ities were not well organised nor well supported despite the various claims 
made by Italian politicians both in the liberal era and later under the aegis of 
Fascism. The years between 1936 and 1939 are a good case study as Italian 
diplomacy certainly worked hard to support the Palestinian Revolt both finan-
cially and through propaganda, yet back in Italy the Catholic press published 
angry articles against the Revolt, which was described as an example of Islamic 
fanaticism. It is not a surprise, then, that this inconsistency eventually led to 
82 ASDMAE, Italian Consulate Jerusalem, Fasc. 417, Busta 54, ‘Proposte Propaganda Fascista 
dello Studente Israel Heller,’ 1932. Letter to Andrea Ippolito, Milan, 3 February 1932.
83 ASMAE, Italian Consulate Jerusalem, Fasc. 417, Busta 54, Gabrielli to Foreign Office 
Rome, Jerusalem, 27 May 1932.
84 Segré, “Liberal and Fascist Italy,” 209.
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the failure of Italian support for the Palestinian Revolt. Besides, despite many 
believing that Palestinians were supporting Italy, the reality was that this was 
a myth, as proven by the numerous articles published by the Palestinian press 
against Italian political activities. It is fair to say that from 1935 onwards some 
newspapers adopted a more positive attitude towards Italy, yet this was dic-
tated more by the principle of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” than a 
genuine support for Italy and its Fascist regime. Filastin in 1936 argued: “The 
Arabs do no trust Italy and even hate it. However, it is certainly possible to 
negotiate with Italy and to reach an agreement”.85
While political influence proved to be a failure, I would argue that the 
deployment of soft power may not have produced the desired outcomes as a 
result of the visible inconsistencies and lack of appropriate support. However, 
the failure of Italian cultural diplomacy in the 1930s did not mean its full 
demise both in the short and long term. For instance, Italian is still a dominant 
language among the Catholic institutions in Palestine, and both the Custos and 
Latin Patriarch are still Italian. However, Italian cultural institutions cannot be 
compared to the quantity and quality of their British, American and French 
counterparts. Italians still rely on the work of EU institutions rather than their 
own. The concept of “bella figura” mentioned earlier seems to be still the lead-
ing principle of Italian cultural diplomacy in Palestine as shown by the amazing 
restoration of the Is’af al-Nashashibi Villa in East Jerusalem by the University 
of Pisa, now hosting Dar Issaf Nashashibi for Culture and Literature.86 While 
the restoration is certainly visible, Italian influence remains limited.
Lorenzo Medici in 2008 argued that: “Italian cultural policy had remark-
able success in this region. After the birth of the Italian Kingdom, particular 
attention had been paid to the Mediterranean, where, because of the presence 
of important Italian communities and, later, Fascist imperial ambitions, Italy 
improved relevant cultural relations”.87 I am not entirely sure how he might 
have reached this conclusion, as if any success was achieved, it was the con-
sistent inconsistency of Italian cultural policies throughout the decades and 
political regimes.
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